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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant Halton Flowers pled guilty to statutory rape and was sentenced
to ten years with the first five years fixed. Appellant timely appealed and, in a
brief filed on August 3, 2009, asserted that the district court abused its discretion
by imposing that sentence. Thereafter, Mr. Flowers brought an Idaho Criminal
Rule 33 motion for withdrawal of guilty plea in the district court. The instant
appeal was suspended pending its resolution. The district court ultimately denied
said Motion.
Appellant has filed contemporaneously herewith a motion to file this
supplemental brief augmenting the original Appellant's brief and challenging the
denial of his Rule 33 motion.
Course of Proceedings
The pre-appeal proceedings have already been described in Appellant's
initial opening brief and will not be repeated here. While the appeal was pending,
Mr. Flowers filed a pro se Motion to withdraw plea of guilty and affidavit in
support on September 25, 2009. Counsel was appointed, and a hearing was
held on November 10, 2009. The court denied the Motion at the hearing, which
was memorialized in a written Order entered that same day.
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1 The Motion to withdraw guilty plea (hereinafter Motion), Affidavit in support
(Affidavit), and Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (Order) have
previously been augmented to the record.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred in denying the Rule 33 motion
for withdrawal of guilty plea
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ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE RULE 33 MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
A.

Standard of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 33 provides as follows in relevant part:
(c) Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition
of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit
the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.

I.C.R. 33.
The Idaho Supreme Court described the standard for review for a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea in State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 177 P.3d 966 (2008):
The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the
sound discretion of the district court, and such discretion should be
liberally applied. Jackson, 96 Idaho at 587, 532 P.2d at 929. The
review of the denial of such a motion is limited to determining
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as
distinguished from arbitrary action. Id.
Id., 177 P.3d p. 969.

B.

The Motion, Hearing, and Court's Ruling
Mr. Flowers asserted several grounds for withdrawal of his guilty plea in

his pro se Motion and Affidavit. First, Mr. Flowers asserted that his guilty plea
was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because he was not
advised prior to entry of his plea, by either the court or counsel, of the
requirement that he register as a sex offender in violation of I.C.R. 11(d)(2)
(Motion, p. 2; Affidavit, p. 1-2.)

3

Second, Mr. Flowers asserted that his plea was not voluntary due to the
state's breach of the plea agreement, both at sentencing and at the later Rule 35
hearing. The background for this issue follows.
At the change of plea hearing, defense counsel stated the (unwritten) plea
agreement was as follows:
MR. DYKMAN: Yes, Your Honor, we do have a plea agreement on
this man, also. He is going to plead guilty to statutory rape. The
State's going to recommend three fixed, seven indeterminate and
they're going to dismiss all other charges in all other cases. We're
free to make our own recommendations at sentencing.
COURT: Alright, Mr. Hiedeman.
MR. HIEDEMEN: That's correct, Your Honor, I would move at this
time, pursuant to that agreement, to dismiss counts two and three
of the information.
COURT: Okay. That motion is granted. Count two, lewd conduct
with a child under sixteen; and count three, attempted lewd conduct
with a child under sixteen, will be dismissed upon defendant
entering a plea of guilty to rape. And, Mr. Hiedeman, is this going to
be charged as statutory rape?
MR. HIEDEMAN: Yes sir.
Change of Plea Tr. 11/10/2008, p.1, In. 13-p.2, In. 3.
The first problem arose at the sentencing. When stating his objections to
the PSI, defense counsel argued as follows:
MR. DYKMAN: Page eleven, Your Honor, I just thought this was
unusual, on that first paragraph at the very end, it says Additionally
Mr. Flowers did indicate during the interview that he touched the
breasts of A.T. I just thought on a dismissed charge, I talked to my
client about that. He indicates to me that what happened was that
the probation/parole officer solicited that comment from him. I think
it's probably inappropriate. I would probably ask the Court to strike
that because it's - he's never - even though he was charged, he
wasn't convicted of that and I just think it is inappropriate to have it
in the PSI. But again, that's my opinion on it, Your Honor.
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COURT: That was dismissed?
MR. DYKMAN: Yes. So I just think it was inappropriate to have it in
the PSI in the comment. It's almost like boot-strapping.
COURT: Okay, that's the a fourteen year female?

where he touched the breasts of A.T.,

MR. DYKMAN: Yes.
COURT: Okay, Mr. Pearson, do you have any comments on that?
MR. PEARSON: Your Honor, I think the Court can give it whatever
weight's necessary. I would note for the record that that particular
individual is in the courtroom here today, with her mother. While
they understand they are not entitled to give a witness impact
statement, I think the Court can take into consideration the entire
facts regarding the situation. While there was a plea agreement, I
think the Court has a right to understand everything that went on
with Mr. Flowers so it can sentence him appropriately, based upon
all the facts.
f)

MR. DYKMAN: I guess I'm concerned - is we have a plea
agreement. The state's bound by the plea agreement, and they're
bound to go along with certain recommendations and not comment
on charges that have been dismissed.
COURT: WellMR. DYKMAN: I think it's inappropriate.
COURT: Okay, -MR. DYKMAN: So I'm going to object.
COURT: Okay. Okay, anything else you want to challenge in the
presentence report, itself?
Sentencing Tr. 12/15/08, p. 6, In. 7-p. 7, In. 21 (emphasis added).
Later on in the hearing while making its sentence recommendation, the
prosecutor, argued ... "with this type of conduct, and all the other conducts that
was [sic] surrounded this particular case, this is not a person who should be in
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our community. He is a risk to young ladies." Sentencing Tr. 12/15/08, p. 17, Ins.
22-25.
While the state did recommend a sentence of ten years with the first three
years fixed, the court imposed a sentence of 15 years with the first five years
fixed.
Mr. Flowers then brought a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. At
the hearing on the Rule 35 motion, when the court asked the prosecutor for
comments, he said:
Thank you, Your Honor. Whether or not he 13 turned himself in
Indiana, he ran to Indiana. He had this outstanding. He knew he
had this outstanding. He failed to appear twice on this particular
charge because he was gone. And then, if the Court will recall, he
may have initiated extradition proceedings, but when the state
determined how much it was going to cost to go get him, we had to
have three hearings on whether or not we were spending too much.
I mean, it's not as if this individual was just like, alright, I'm wrong,
come get me, let's get this taken care of. He wanted to fight it the
whole step of the way, and that's what happened. I don't think this
is as honest and true as we're being lead to believe here today. !
don't think granting the Rule 35 is appropriate and we would ask
you to keep his sentence the same.
Rule 35 hearing 1/26/09, p. 4, Ins. 12-25 (emphasis added).
The court denied the Rule 35 motion.
Based on the above, Mr. Flowers argued in his Motion and Affidavit that
the breach was twofold. First, Mr. Flowers complained that at sentencing, the
state breached the plea agreement by acting inconsistent with the plea
agreement which included the dismissal of charges against him.

While Mr.

Flowers stated that he is not addressing whether the court can or cannot
consider dismissed charges, the state could not bring them up or argue them.
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Mr. Flowers contended the state did just that when it controverted his counsel's
objection to the PSI's inclusion of a dismissed charge and instead argued that
the court could and should consider the dismissed charges in sentencing
because it argued that the court could consider everything and sentence him
appropriately based on all the facts.
Moreover, even after defense counsel reminded the state of the plea
bargain, later, the state's argument included the dismissed charges when it
included in it "and all the other conducts that was surrounding this particular
case." Mr. Flowers argued that the state's comments had a cumUlative effect
which is shown by the fact that he did not receive its recommended sentence of
ten years with three fixed, but the substantially increased sentence of 15 years
with five fixed. (Affidavit, p. 2-3.)
Mr. Flowers also argued that the state breached the plea agreement in the
Rule 35 hearing by arguing against his request for leniency and relief from the
sentence which exceeded that recommended by the state. In his Affidavit, Mr.
Flowers stated that while the plea agreement was unwritten and ambiguous as to
the duration of the sentence recommendation, it was his understanding that the
state's recommendation applied to his case overall and not just at the
sentencing. He did not believe that the state's recommendation was subject to
change simply because the court did something different at the sentencing.

He

understood the Rule 35 hearing to be an extension of the sentencing because it
is only to possibly reduce or modify a sentence. (Affidavit, p. 2.)
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Finally, Mr. Flowers' third argument in his Motion concerned the court not
having actually accepted his plea of guilty, which has the following background.
At the beginning of the change of plea colloquy, after establishing the
factual basis, the court stated that it accepted the plea of guilty to count one and
granted the state's motion to dismiss the other charges. (Change of Plea Tr.

11/10108, p. 3.) After that, it went on to asking questions relevant to the required
determinations under I.C.R. 11 (c), to wit, that the plea was voluntary, that he was
informed of the consequences of the plea (he was actually only informed of the
maximum imprisonment possible), that he was informed of his rights, and
whether any promises had been made. (Change of Plea Tr. 11/10108, p. 3-6.)
After that, the court asked of defense counsel whether there was any
reason it should not accept the plea of guilty, to which defense counsel answered
no, but then a discussion ensued about a mental evaluation. (Change of Plea Tr.

11/10108, p. 6-7.) The court then asked the prosecutor whether there was any
reason why it should not accept the plea of guilty, to which the prosecutor
answered no, and then the mental health evaluation discussion was continued.
(Change of Plea Tr. 11/101088, p. 7.) Then the court went on to discuss the PSI
form and other matters, never returning to whether it should accept the plea and
never stating it was doing so or adjudging Mr. Flowers guilty of the crime.
In other words, the court never actually accepted the plea of guilty after it
had made the determinations required by I.C.R. 11(c) or adjudged him guilty of
the crime.

Mr. Flowers argued in his Motion and Affidavit that the court did not

accept the guilty plea, and he was never formally adjudged guilty under I.C. § 19-
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101. Since he had never been adjudged guilty, he could not be sentenced (and
thus his sentence was illegal, and he was being unlawfully held in prison ).
However, more to the point, the pre-sentencing "just reason" standard for
withdrawal of his guilty plea should apply, not the post-sentence "manifest
injustice" standard. (Motion, p. 2; Affidavit, p. 2.)
Again, there was a hearing on the Motion (at which Mr. Flowers was not
personally present). Unfortunately, neither his attorney nor the prosecutor came
close to understanding what his arguments really were (or the correct responses
to them), so their comments will not be discussed here.

While the court did

somewhat better when it recited the arguments that it believed the Motion and
Affidavit to make, its rulings show that it nevertheless missed the point.
For example, at the hearing, regarding the breach of plea agreement
issue, the court held "... I think would be subject to the direct appeal that he has
pending before the Idaho Supreme Court at this point in time . . . . " (Hearing

11/10109, p. 3, Ins. 22-24.)

The court did not further address the breach of plea

agreement at the hearing or in its written Order memorializing its rulings filed the
same day.
The court also stated at the hearing that there was nothing in the record
that indicates it was an illegal sentence or that the court did not accept his plea to
the charge. (Hearing 11/10109, p. 3-4.)
In its written Order, the court held as follows regarding the argument that
the court failed to advise Mr. Flowers of the sex offender registration requirement
in violation of I.C.R. 11(d)(2):
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The Defendant further asserts that he was not informed of the fact
he would have to register as a sex offender and the judge's failure
to notify him of this would justify allowing him to withdraw his guilty
plea. Even if that were the case failure of a judge to notify a
defendant that he will have to register as a sex offender is not
sufficient cause to allow for the withdraw of a guilty plea. The
requirement of sex offender registration is not a direct consequence
of a guilty plea. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 982 P.2d 931(1999).
Sex offender registration in the state of Idaho is not punitive, but
remedial. id. 100.
Order, p. 2.
The court also stated that there was nothing in the record that indicates
that the Defendant did not understand the proceedings or was confused as to
what he was pleading guilty to, and the district court followed the constitutional
requirements of due process in accepting the Defendant's plea.

The court

concluded that it could not find manifest injustice resulted in the acceptance of
the guilty plea and, therefore, denied the Motion. (Order, p. 2-3.)

C.

The Court Erred Denying the Motion Based on the Breach of the Plea

Agreement
To begin with, the court obviously erred in ruling that the breach of the
plea agreement argument should be brought in the instant direct appeal rather
than in the district court via the Motion. While the issue that the state breached a
plea agreement can be brought for the first time on appeal as fundamental error,
it does not mean that the district court should not decide the issue in the first
instance when it has the opportunity to do so. Regardless, the issue is now
properly before this Court.
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As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Jones, 139 Idaho
299, 77 P.3d 988 (Ct.App. 2003):
It is well established that "when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92
S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). This principle is
derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule
that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-47,
81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442-43 (1984); If the prosecution has breached its
promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was
intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea
was knowing and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead
guilty on a false premise. In such event, the defendant will be
entitled to relief. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30
L.Ed.2d at 433; Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508-09, 104 S.Ct. at 2546-47,
81 L.Ed.2d at 442-43; As a remedy, the court may order specific
performance of the agreement or may permit the defendant to
withdraw the guilty plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at
499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433; ....
The prosecution's obligation to recommend a sentence promised in
a plea agreement does not carry with it the obligation to make the
recommendation enthusiastically. A prosecutor may not circumvent
a plea agreement, however, through words or actions that convey a
reservation about a promised recommendation, nor may a
prosecutor impliedly disavow the recommendation as something
which the prosecutor no longer supports. Although prosecutors
need not use any particular form of expression in recommending an
agreed sentence, "their overall conduct must be reasonably
consistent with making such a recommendation, rather than the
reverse."
Id., p. 301-302 (internal citations omitted).

As further explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in the recent case of
State v. Lampien, _

Idaho _, 2009 WL 4928357 (2009):

Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law
freely reviewed by this Court in accordance with contract law
standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho, 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399
(2005). A claim that the State breached a plea agreement affects
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whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the
plea agreement, and therefore goes to the foundation or basis of a
defendant's rights. !d. at 74, 106 P.3d at 400. If the State breaches
a promise made to a defendant in exchange for a guilty plea, the
defendant is constitutionally entitled to relief. !d.
!d., 2009 WL 4928357, p. 8.

Again, there were two parts to the plea bargain in this case, a sentence
recommendation and also the dismissal of charges.

Regarding the dismissed

charges, regardless of whether or not the court could sua sponte consider them,
the state acted inconsistently with its promise to Mr. Flowers when it argued that
the court could and should do so.
As shown in the passages above, when defense counsel objected to the
inclusion of information regarding a dismissed charge in the PSI, the state
advised the court that a victim of the dismissed charge was in the courtroom and
argued that despite the plea bargain, the court can take the entire situation into
account and sentence Mr. Flowers appropriately based upon all the facts 2
In response, defense counsel expressly declared that under the plea
agreement the state was bound to not comment on the dismissed charges.
Significantly, the prosecutor did not controvert this statement or otherwise
respond at the time. Instead, he waited until his sentencing argument, and then
argued that Mr. Flowers should not be in the community and was a risk to young
ladies based on all the conducts surrounding this case.

While the state was

attempting to be surreptitious with its argument, perhaps because it understood

2 Not incidentally, since the rape charge carried a maximum sentence of
life in prison, any bargain from the dismissal of other charges is illusory if the
state can argue they should form part of the basis of the sentence.
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at that point it could not properly comment on the dismissed charges, its
reference to not just the instant conduct, but to all the conducts surrounding the
instant case and use of the plural "ladies," was not even a thinly veiled reference
to the dismissed charges.
Even if the state really believed that it retained the right under the plea
agreement to comment on the dismissed charges, it needed to say so when
defense counsel stated his understanding was otherwise, rather than stand
silent and do it anyway later in the hearing. Its silence in the face of the defense
counsel's description of its obligation under that term should be considered to be
the state's agreement therewith.

In any event, under contract principles, an

ambiguous term in a plea bargain should be construed in the defendant's favor. 3
Appellant further asserts that the state is precluded from now claiming that
it could properly comment on the dismissed charges because it also did not
make this claim when the breach was raised in the Motion. In other words, the
state failed to establish a contrary understanding of the plea agreement by an
affidavit or even a representation by the prosecutor at the hearing.
To conclude regarding this issue, Appellant asserts that the breach at
sentencing is twofold (but either one is sufficient for relief here), the first instance
occurring when the state argued that the court should consider the dismissed
charges and brought up the other victim, and the second when it later referenced
all the conducts.

3 While this case is not final and so is not yet being relied upon as
authority, State v. Peterson, _ Idaho_, 2010 WL 424355, p. 4 (Ct.App. 2/8/10),
came to these same conclusions.
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Appellant also asserts that the state breached the plea agreement during
the Rule 35 hearing. There, the state violated its promise to recommend that Mr.
Flowers receive a sentence of ten years with the first three years fixed by arguing
that the court should not reduce, but keep the same, the imposed sentence of 15
years with the first five years fixed.
As shown above, at the change of plea hearing the defense described the
agreement by saying that the state is going to recommend three fixed and seven
indeterminate, to which the prosecutor agreed. There was no term in the plea
agreement which would limit the recommendation only to the initial sentencing
proceeding and not to a Rule 35 hearing.
In other words, the promise was for the state to recommend a particular
sentence, not to recommend it at sentencing. There was simply no term which
provided that said recommendation would be at made only at the sentencing. If
the state did not want to be bound in that fashion, it should have said so, but it
did not. Thus, since in our case the state did not simply agree to make a
recommendation at sentencing, it is not like State v. Cole, 135 Idaho 269, 16
P.3d 945 (Ct.App. 2000), where the state did not breach its agreement to remain
silent at sentencing by its action at the Rule 35 hearing.
Rather, the more instructive case is the decision in State v. Lampien, _
Idaho _, 2009 WL 4928357 (Idaho 2009). There, the Supreme Court held that

since the agreement was to be bound to the sentence agreement, the state was
required to commit to the sentencing recommendation at every stage of the
proceedings.
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Our case is the same; the agreement was to make a sentencing
recommendation, as opposed to agreeing to make a recommendation at
sentencing. Thus, since the state did not limit the scope of its agreement to
make a particular sentence recommendation, it was bound to adhere to it in
subsequent proceedings and so breached the plea agreement when it did not.
Further, while Appellant asserts that the fact that there was no limitation to
the duration of the recommendation is clear from the record, to the extent that
additional evidence regarding the understanding of the parties is necessary, it
exists.

Mr. Flowers stated in his Affidavit that his understanding of the plea

agreement was that the recommendation requirement extended to the Rule 35
hearing. This swom evidence was uncontroverted by the state which, despite an
opportunity to do so, did not offer a contrary understanding, be it swom or even a
simple representation at the hearing on the Motion. Thus the only evidence is
that the sentence recommendation term extended to the Rule 35 hearing.
Finally, even if the term was ambiguous, again, it should be construed in the
defendant's favor.
To summarize, the state breached the plea agreement at the sentencing
and at the Rule 35 hearing, but either breach is sufficient to entitle Mr. Flowers to
relief. As explained above, the state's breach of the plea agreement resulted in a
plea which was not voluntary and intelligent and is also a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution (5th &

14th

Amendments).

Appellant further asserts that such a breach is a due process violation under
Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution as well.
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Mr. Flowers was denied the benefit of his bargain, and, as mentioned
above, two remedies are available, to wit, specific performance or withdrawal of
the plea agreement. Here, Mr. Flowers requests that he be allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea, and this matter be remanded to a different judge.
But further still, Mr. Flowers points out that even if the plea agreement is
considered to have been voluntarily and intelligently made despite the breach,
the state still took on certain obligations in the plea bargain which were not met.
Puckett v. United States, _ U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (2009). According to that
case, he is still entitled to seek a remedy, which may include rescission of the
agreement whereby he can take back the consideration he furnished by
withdrawing his plea, or specific performance, where he is resentenced with the
state honoring its promises to him. Id. p. 1430. In our case, given the multiple
breaches at multiple hearings, Appellant contends that withdrawal of the plea is
the most appropriate remedy, but alternatively and secondarily requests a
resentencing, and that it be before a different judge because of those multiple
breaches.
To conclude, while the district court in this case erred by not addressing
the breach of the plea agreement issue in conjunction with the Motion, in any
event, the state did commit a breach which entitles Mr. Flowers to relief.

D.

The District Court Erred by Denying the Motion Due to the Violations of

I.C.R. 11
To begin with, I.C.R.11 provides as follows in relevant part:
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Rule 11. Pleas

(c) Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is
accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show:
(1) The voluntariness of the plea.
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea,
including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct
consequences which may apply.
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the
defendant would waive the right against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront
witnesses against the defendant.
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against
the defendant.
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or
whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and.
if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was
informed that the court is not bound by any promises or
recommendation from either party as to punishment.
(d) Other advisories upon acceptance of plea. The district judge
shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the making of factual
admissions during a plea colloquy, instruct on the following:
(1) The court shall inform all defendants that if the defendant is not
a citizen of the United States, the entry of a plea or making of
factual admissions could have consequences of deportation or
removal, inability to obtain legal status in the United States, or
denial of an application for United States citizenship.
(2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense requiring
registration on the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the
defendant of such registration requirements.
(3) If the defendant is waiving his right to appeal or other postconviction proceedings as part of his guilty plea, and such condition
of the plea has been called to the attention of the court, the court
shall confirm with the defendant his awareness of the waiver of
appeal or other proceedings.
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(e) Plea Advisory Form. As an aid in taking a plea of guilty, the
court may require the defendant to fill out and submit the plea
advisory form found in Appendix A of these rules. In addition to the
form, the court must make a record showing:

(1) The defendant understands the nature of the charge(s),
including any mental element such as intent, knowledge, state of
mind;
(2) The defendant understands the maximum and minimum
punishments, and any other direct consequences which may apply;
(3) The defendant understood the contents of the guilty plea
advisory form, and the defendant's plea is voluntary.

I.C.R. 11 (emphasis added).
Mr. Flowers raised two issues regarding the change of plea hearing. First,
he asserted that his plea was invalid because he had not been advised
beforehand of the requirement he register as a sex offender.
The district court's ruling was, again, that under Ray v. State,133 Idaho
96, 982 P.2d 931 (1999), sex offender registration was an indirect consequence
of a plea of guilty, so Mr. Flowers did not need to be advised of it prior to
pleading guilty.
This ruling neglects the fact that after Ray was decided, I.C.R. 11 was
amended, and now subsection (d)(2) expressly requires that the court shall
advise the defendant of the sex offender registration requirement.

Thus the

instant violation is not the one rejected in Ray. to wit, of I.C.R. 11 (c)(2), but rather
of I.C.R. 11 (d)(2).
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In our case, the district court did not comply with I.C.R. 11(d)(2) and so
violated a mandatory provision of the Rule. Regardless of whether or not sex
offender registration has previously been deemed an indirect consequence, Mr.
Flowers was not advised of a consequence of which he was now required to be
advised, and thus the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. While
Appellant asserts that this rises to the level of a constitutional due process
violation, this is actually not even required. As the Court of Appeals explained in
State v. Stone, _ Idaho_, 208 P.3d 734 (Ct.App. 2009):

If a plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due
process standards, which require that a guilty plea be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, then "manifest injustice" or
the lower standard of "just reason" will be established as a matter
of law. However, a constitutional defect in the plea is not
necessary in order to show either a "just reason" or "manifest
injustice."
Id., p. 737 (internal citations omitted).

Thus Appellant asserts that the court's failure to provide the mandatory
advisory is sufficient to allow withdrawal of the plea, regardless of whether it is a
violation of the Constitution or just the Rule, because either way Mr. Flowers was
not advised of what he had to be. As to the violation itself, it is indisputable that
Mr. Flowers was not advised of the sex offender registration requirement prior to
entry of his plea.
In addition to the uncontroverted evidence from his Affidavit, a review of
the change of plea hearing shows that Mr. Flowers was not advised of the sex
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offender registration requirement during it, since it was never mentioned. Nor
was it mentioned in the guilty plea questionnaire he completed. 4 (R., p. 163-154.)
In conclusion, since the court erred when it violated I.C.R.11 (d)(2) by
failing to provide the mandatory advisory, the court also erred by denying the
Motion for this reason.
Finally, Appellant asserts that a further violation of I.C.R. 11 occurred and
is otherwise relevant here. As Mr. Flowers' Motion explained, the court never
actually accepted his guilty plea nor did the court adjudge him to be guilty, which
then brings into play Idaho Code § 19-101:
19-101. Legal conviction necessary to punishment

No person can be punished for a public offense except upon a legal
conviction in a court having jurisdiction thereof.
I.C. § 19-101.
In State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 581 P.2d 319 (1978), the Supreme
Court interpreted this statute (the case concerned the withheld judgment statute)
and held:
We conclude that for purposes of I.C. section 19-101 conviction
occurs when a verdict or plea of guilty is accepted by the court.
Accordingly, where a verdict or plea of guilty has been accepted by
the court but judgment on that plea or verdict has been withheld,
section 19-101 does not preclude the imposition of criminal
punishment, fines and imprisonment, as conditions of that withheld
judgment.
Id., p. 278 (emphasis added).

4 The guilty plea questionnaire in the record is not the same as the plea advisory
form appended to the Rule 11 pursuant to the amendment effective July 1, 2007,
even though the change of plea was in November 2008.
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Thus, according to Mr. Flowers, since the court never actually accepted
his guilty plea nor adjudged him guilty, he was not convicted, which means two
things: first, he is being held in prison, in violation of the law, since he could not
be sentenced without being convicted, and second, since he was not sentenced,
the pre-sentence standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea should apply, to wit, just
reason, rather than the post-sentence standard of manifest injustice.
While Appellant continues these arguments on appeal, he also contends
that there is an additional violation of I.C.R. 11 present as well.

A close review

of the change of plea hearing shows that the court did state that it accepts the
plea of guilty, but it did so at the beginning, right after it established the factual
basis. (Change of Plea Tr. 11/10108, p. 3.) The court then went on to question
Mr. Flowers regarding whether the plea was voluntary and whether he was made
any promises, partially advised him of the consequences, and advised him of his
rights. After these required inquires, however, the court never again states that it
accepts the guilty plea.

Rather, it starts to discuss it and then appears to

become distracted by other matters before doing so and never actually returns to
the task at hand and accepts the guilty plea or adjudges Mr. Flowers guilty.
I.C.R. 11(c) provides as follows in relevant part:

(c) Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is
accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show:
(1) The voluntariness of the plea.
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea,
including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct
consequences which may apply.
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(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the
defendant would waive the right against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront
witnesses against the defendant.
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against
the defendant.
(5) Whether any promises have been made· to the defendant, or
whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and
if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was
informed that the court is not bound by any promises or
recommendation from either party as to punishment.
I.C.R. 11 (emphasis added).
Clearly, the Rule requires that the court establish that the plea of guilty is
valid before it is accepted, not after. Thus, by accepting the plea of guilty before
and not after establishing the requirements for a valid plea mandated by I.C.R.
11 (c), the court violated that provision. 5
Therefore, since the court again violated I.C.R. 11 by not following the
requirements of the Rule when taking the plea, the plea is invalid.

Thus, in

addition to Mr. Flowers' arguments about his sentence being illegal and the presentencing standard applying, Appellant altematively asserts that if his plea is
nevertheless considered to have been accepted, albeit incorrectly, then he
should also be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea for this reason.

While it does not matter to the analysis since there is still an I.C.R. 11 violation,
Appellant suspects that what the court was really meaning to do at the beginning
of the hearing was to state that it accepted the plea bargain, as opposed to the
guilty plea.
5
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Flowers respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Order
denying his Rule 33 motion and remand this matter to the district court for
withdrawal of the guilty plea, or alternatively and secondarily, for resentencing
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